War Plans and Sealift

What if we're not planning a land war in Asia?

The other day an Admiral was questioned about the sufficiency of “sealift”

"Where is our sealift capacity relative to the PRC?"

"In terms of Sealift, we have a distinct advantage over the PLC in both numbers and capabilities" ADM Aquilino

Well, some very knowledgeable folks on Twitter took exception to this assertion. However, it really depends on what our maritime strategy is.

They may be correct if the issue is sustaining a fleet at sea and an island hopping Marine force in the various archipelagos surrounding the South China Sea during a war of containment of the Chinese maritime force in all its iterations (PLAN, naval militia, Coast Guard, irregular fishing fleet, etc.). We need more sustainment ships (tanker, ammunition, and food ships) to provide a sea train of ships from the continental United States to those archipelagos. Not to mention repair ships, sea going tugs, and the bevy of support an active fleet requires.

But they are wrong if the idea is that we are somehow foolish enough to try and replicate Desert Storm in Asia. And Desert Storm is what woke the Chinese up to the power of the United States and its ability to move mountains of supplies, hordes of people, and tons of equipment.

The Chinese began to plan to counter a Desert Storm scenario. Their plan is to push US and allied forces too far out to sea to be effective in decapitating their government.

They developed “carrier killer missiles” (whether they will work or not is sort of beside the point - as with naval mines, they are factor to be considered). They observed the range issues with our carrier air wings (an own goal if there ever was one) and planned on layered defenses to take on long range land based air. They developed a fleet that outnumbers the forces available to the Seventh Fleet in the region that the Chinese consider to be “sphere of influence.” They maintain a large army to resist amphibious operations on their shores. They have the capability of reaching US allies in the “first island chain” with missiles and aircraft - and that threat may cause allies to think twice about wholehearted support of the US war plans.

The Chinese are reaching out into the second island chain in an attempt to further push the US forces out of their expanded “region of interest.”

Could they bottle up the US fleet from surging forces from the Atlantic? Well, we’ve seen the effect of a merchant ship running aground in the Suez Canal - why wouldn’t that be a part of a plan to cut that route to the US and allied navies? How about damaging the Panama Canal? Transiting to the Pacific from the Atlantic now becomes the need to sail around the tips of Africa and South America - which adds time and trouble to the effort to boost the Pacific allied forces. What about sinking ships in the narrow entrances to US ports?

What happens to the ships bringing petroleum from the Middle East? From Arica? What happens when we’ve cut our domestic oil and gas production and refining capacity to the extent we can’t sustain our current forces in a conflict? What happens if the major naval petroleum storage facility in the Pacific is closed and we lack the ships needed to replace that capacity ? Are our offshore/onshore wind and solar panel farms going to help our young men and women on ships out near Guam?

If Guam is targeted (and it will be) where will we base all the aircraft needed to refuel both Air Force and Navy planes as they go further west into the Philippine Sea and beyond? How will the vital refueling aircraft be protected? The distance from Hawaii to Guam is close to 4000 miles. That’s a long haul.

If it’s going to be hard for warships to go places, what about a sealift force full of all that stuff needed to go ashore in a contested space and stay there? How many ships would be required to sustain that force?

So, if I was a military planner, I’d be far more concerned with shipping issues that totally forget a Desert Storm scenario and focus on the ships (both Navy and sustainment) that would help persuade the Communist Chinese Party that any move to expand their sphere of influence is not worth the cost.

I’d be looking a more submarines, more fast sealift for those island hopping Marines, more sustainment shipping to keep the fighting fleet at sea, and many more small, fast missile boats to augment the larger fleet.

And, maybe, just maybe, Admiral Aquilino is not as wrong as some think.